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TAKE MY PROPERTY PLEASE! WHO SHOULD
BEAR THE BURDEN OF CLEANING UP TOXIC
METHAMPHETAMINE LAB WASTE?
Emily I. Krause'
When Kent and Cindy Needham purchased their second home to save
additional money to purchase their dream home, they had no idea that
their purchase would quickly lead them near bankruptcy.' Shortly after
the Needhams moved into their second home, they began experiencing
physical ailments including blisters and exacerbated symptoms of Mrs.
Needham's dormant multiple sclerosis.' Unfortunately, their physical
reactions were symptoms of a larger problem that detrimentally affected
the Needham's finances. The house had been used as a laboratory to
"cook" methamphetamine, resulting in hazardous chemical residue that
leeched into the porous surfaces of their home, costing the Needhams
thousands of dollars for the professional inspection and cleanup.
As much as it may seem that this unfortunate story is an isolated inci-
dent, the Needhams' home-buying experience is not unique. Newspapers
and magazines across the country report similar incidents of homeowners
unknowingly moving into former methamphetamine laboratories, who
discover the history of their home's use upon experiencing detrimental
health effects and spend thousands of dollars to clean up the home or
+ J.D. Candidate, 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Lucia Silecchia for providing guidance and
expertise, the staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their editing efforts, and her
family and friends for their support. And thank you, Daniel, for making every day special.
1. Richard Jerome et al., Home Toxic Home?: Buyer Beware: Owners of Homes
Once Used as Methamphetamine Labs Are Having Health Problems-and Sometimes Go-
ing Broke Trying to Clean Up Their Toxic Houses, PEOPLE, Aug. 8, 2005, at 50, 52-53.
2. Id. at 52.
3. Id. at 53.
4. Id. at 52-53. Shortly after moving in, a neighbor told the Needhams that the per-
son who sold the property to them was also the methamphetamine manufacturer who
caused the contamination. Id. at 52.
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attempt to resell it to recover their costs. State legislatures are taking
note of the growing problems associated with contamination of residen-
tial properties7 used as methamphetamine labs and are working toward
combating these problems by enacting statutes that establish standards
for cleaning up the hazardous chemical waste that is left behind.8
However, for many property owners, the problems associated with
methamphetamine contamination remain. In the interest of protecting
the public, some states place the burden of cleaning up methampheta-
mine waste on the property owners inhabiting the property when the
5. See id. at 52-54 (documenting the experiences of the Needhams in California in
addition to the experiences of homeowners in Minnesota and Colorado); New Law Re-
quires Disclosure of Meth Production When Selling Property: Traces of Chemicals, Residue
May Remain in House, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, July 24, 2005, at 5B (documenting attempt
of new law to prevent similar cases in South Dakota); Karen Youso, Hidden Hazard: Is the
House You're Buying a Former Meth Lab? A New Law Will Make it Easier to Find Out.
But the Safety Net Has Holes., STAR TRIB., June 26, 2005, at Al (documenting the experi-
ences of homeowners in Minnesota).
6. The federal government has also made an effort to combat the spread of metham-
phetamine and the dangers associated with its manufacture by introducing legislation di-
rected at the methamphetamine problem. See Methamphetamine Remediation Research
Act of 2005, H.R. 798, 109th Cong. §§ 1, 3-4, 6 (2005) (providing federal funding for studies
regarding effective environmental cleanup of methamphetamine laboratories and for the
establishment of cleanup guidelines); Federal Emergency Meth Lab Cleanup Funding Act
of 2005, S. 259, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (providing for the use of federal forfeiture funds to
cover 90% of the costs of cleaning up a methamphetamine laboratory if "the property
owner did not have knowledge of the existence or operation of such laboratory before the
law enforcement action to close it; or ... the property owner notifies law enforcement not
later than 24 hours after discovering the existence of such laboratory"); Clean, Learn,
Educate, Abolish, Neutralize, and Undermine Production (CLEAN-UP) of Metham-
phetamines Act, H.R. 13, 109th Cong. §§ 102-03 (2005) (providing federal funding for
cleanup of methamphetamine contamination on federal property and agricultural land);
see also Meth Problem Demands Multi-Pronged Offensive, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 11, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 7553929 (discussing the federal legislative initiative in Illinois and
Minnesota).
7. Residential property is not the only type of property that is used for metham-
phetamine manufacture and subsequently contaminated. See CLEAN-UP of Metham-
phetamines Act, H.R. 13, §§ 101-02 (recognizing need to provide remedy for metham-
phetamine contamination on federal land and agricultural land); Nitza E. Coleman, Com-
ment, After the Bust: Landowner's Liability When the Property Is Used for the Manufacture
of Methamphetamine, 13 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 109, 109, 130-32 (2003) (discussing
methamphetamine contamination in rural areas affecting agricultural land).
8. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1301 (2005) ("Remediation of properties [con-
taminated by the manufacture of methamphetamine] has been frustrated by the lack of a
decontamination standard. The purpose of this part is to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare by providing specific cleanup standards .... "); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
64.44.005 (West 2005) ("The legislature finds that some properties are being contaminated
by hazardous chemicals used in unsafe or illegal ways in the manufacture of illegal drugs.
Innocent members of the public may be harmed by the residue left by these chemicals
when the properties are subsequently rented or sold without having been decontami-
nated.").
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contamination is discovered.9 Therefore, property owners who find or
receive notice that their property was used to manufacture metham-
phetamine are in the same position as the Needhams under the new legis-
lation-forced to pay professional inspectors and cleaning firms to decon-
taminate their property to remain in compliance with state law. 0
With the enactment of these new cleanup laws, there is a tension de-
veloping between individual property owners who desire to protect the
investment they have made in their property and government actors who
desire to protect the public by cleaning up hazardous environmental
waste as soon as it is discovered." For example, at a public hearing con-
cerning a proposed ordinance in a North Dakota county that would re-
quire property owners to pay cleanup costs, a county commissioner justi-
fied placing the burden on property owners by citing "'a certain degree of
financial responsibility"' that comes with owning property. 2 Meanwhile,
a county resident asserted, "'I'm not getting stuck with the bill .... I
won't pay for it unless I get caught.""..3
This tension between the individual property owner and the state is not
new in the area of property law; as one scholar explains: "Property re-
gimes always consist of some individual rights, mixed with some rights
shared with nearby associates or neighbors, mixed with still more rights
shared with a larger community, all held in relatively stable but neverthe-
less changing and subtly renegotiated relationships.' 4 The relationship
between individuals and the government is exemplified in the Takings
Clause: "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."' 5 When the balance within these relationships is threat-
9. See Kira Millage, Measure Would Force Meth-Lab Cleanup, BELLINGHAM
HERALD, July 9, 2005, at 3A, available at LEXIS (acknowledging responsibility of prop-
erty owners to pay cleanup costs under existing Washington law); Elisa L. Rineheart,
Cleanup Law Irks Residents: Plan Would Require Property Owners To Clean Up Drug
Labs, GRAND FORKS HERALD, May 25, 2005, at 1A (reporting that property owners con-
tested the provision of a proposed ordinance for a county in North Dakota requiring prop-
erty owners to pay the cost of environmental cleanup); Betsy Z. Russell, Law Targets Meth
Lab Messes in Idaho: New Cleanup Rules Aim To Return Properties to Healthful Stan-
dards, SPOKESMAN-REV., June 7, 2005, at Al (acknowledging expensive cleanup costs for
property owners under new Idaho law).
10. See Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 53 (regarding the experiences of the
Needhams); Millage, supra note 9 (Washington); Rineheart, supra note 9 (Minnesota);
Russell, supra note 9 (Idaho).
11. See, e.g., Rineheart, supra note 9 (stating that the county needs to investigate the
situation further before enacting the regulation).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J.
601,631 (1998).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Justice Holmes, when discussing the scope of the police
power, stated:
2006]
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ened by an individual property owner refusing to recognize the police
power of the state or the state refusing to recognize the property rights of
the individual property owner, the analysis employed in the United States
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence can be utilized to "renegotiate"
the relationship between the individual property owner and the state.16
This Comment argues that the methamphetamine cleanup legislation
creates an imbalance between individual property owners and the states,
and can be renegotiated by using the analysis of the Court's takings juris-
prudence. Specifically, it argues that legislation requiring property own-
ers to clean up methamphetamine waste could be a regulatory taking 7
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 8 In addition, it argues that
the best way to remedy the burden placed on property owners forced to
clean up methamphetamine contamination is to amend the current legis-
lation to include an "innocent landowner defense" modeled on federal
and state environmental law.
To understand the extent of the problem with methamphetamine and
the particular effect that its manufacture has on residential property, one
must understand the nature of the methamphetamine "threat."19 The
Drug Enforcement Administration has reported that over the past sev-
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the con-
tract and due process clauses are gone.
Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
16. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (illustrating the need
to balance the tension between government and private property interests, the Court
wrote: "[I]f the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be
meaningfully enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests included
in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits"); Pa.
Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413 ("As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits.").
17. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-15 (citing Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415). The Court,
prior to analyzing the facts of the case in Lucas, discussed the history of takings jurispru-
dence and differentiated between takings that amount to a "physical 'invasion"' of prop-
erty and "'regulatory takings,"' or where takings occur when a "regulation ... go[es] 'too
far."' Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415).
18. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (mention-
ing the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
19. Threat to Rural Communities From Methamphetamine Production, Trafficking,
and Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 12 (2000) (statement of George J. Cazenavette, Special Agent in Charge, New Or-
leans Div. Office, Drug Enforcement Admin.) [hereinafter Cazenavette Statement].
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eral years, abuse of methamphetamine ° has "significant[ly] increase[d],"
with cases of abuse "starting on the West Coast, and rapidly expanding
into the Midwest and, to a lesser extent, the Southeastern United
States., 21  In addition, "domestic [production of methamphetamine by
United States citizens] is ... [a] significant problem," because metham-
phetamine is easily produced with common or easily procured household
chemicals and equipment.22
Both the ease with which methamphetamine is produced and the extent
of the methamphetamine addiction across the United States contribute to
the fact that methamphetamine manufacturing in the United States is
performed in small "mom and pop labs" located among residential prop-
erties such as houses, apartments, and hotels, in addition to automo-
biles.23 Further, these labs are clandestine not only because they involve
20. Methamphetamine is a highly addictive drug that "accelerates the body's metabo-
lism." Dan Hannan, Meth Labs: Understanding Exposure Hazards and Associated Prob-
lems, 50 PROF. SAFETY 24, 25 (2005); see also Cazenavette Statement, supra note 19, at 12-
13 (reporting before Congress).
21. Cazenavette Statement, supra note 19, at 12. The expansion of the drug has been
characterized as "wildfire." See News Release, Drug Enforcement Administration, DOJ
and DEA Announce Results of First Major Meth Operation (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/seattleO83105.html (titling a recent metham-
phetamine drug operation and partnership between the Department of Justice and the
Drug Enforcement Agency "Operation Wildfire").
22. Id. at 14. The DEA describes the domestic lab manufacturing process as follows:
A user can go to retail stores and easily purchase the vast majority of the ingredients
necessary to manufacture the drug. Items such as rock salt, battery acid, red phos-
phorous road flares, pool acid, and iodine crystals can be utilized to substitute for
some of the necessary chemicals. Precursor chemicals such as pseudoephedrine can be
extracted from common, over-the-counter cold medications. A clandestine lab opera-
tor can utilize relatively common items such as mason jars, coffee filters, hot plates,
pressure cookers, pillowcases, plastic tubing, gas cans, etc., to substitute for sophisti-
cated laboratory equipment. Unlike Fentanyl, LSD, or other types of dangerous
drugs, it does not take a college-educated chemist to produce methamphetamine.
Id. For a more extensive analysis of the various methods of methamphetamine manufac-
ture and the chemicals involved, see Kansas v. LaMae, 998 P.2d 106, 109 (Kan. 2000) (cit-
ing court testimony of Drug Enforcement Administration Agent in a criminal appeal of a
felony murder charge arising from manufacture of methamphetamine who described the
"heat reduction method of methamphetamine production" and chemicals involved); Han-
nan, supra note 20, at 25-26 (describing types of laboratories and chemicals involved).
23. Cazenavette Statement, supra note 19, at 14; Hannan, supra note 20, at 24-25; see
also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-10-2(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (dealing not with the regula-
tion of methamphetamine cleanup, but instead focusing on preventing the manufacture of
methamphetamine, its findings include extensive references to the environmental and
public impact of methamphetamine manufacture). See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-990(1) (2003) (defining "[c]landestine drug laboratory" to include real property, mobile
homes, recreational vehicles); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1302(2)(a) (2005) (defining
"[i]nhabitable property" as property "primarily occupied by people.., including a storage
facility, mobile home, or recreational vehicle"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.010(6)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (defining "[piroperty ... involved in or affected
by the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, or storage of hazardous chemicals. ...
20061
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criminal activity and are not easily detected by law enforcement, 2 but
also because they are not easily detected by future property owners prior
to purchasing the affected property.2 After time has passed, the illegal
use of the property as a methamphetamine lab may be hidden from pro-
spective buyers with a good ventilation system and a fresh coat of paint,"
includ[ing] ... single-family residences, units of multiplexes, condominiums, apartment
buildings, boats, motor vehicles, trailers, manufactured housing, any shop, booth, garden,
or storage shed, and all contents of the items referenced in this subsection"); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 60A-10-2.
24. See Cazenavette Statement, supra note 19, at 12 (referring to methamphetamine
manufacture in the United States as occurring in "clandestine laboratories").
25. Hannan, supra note 20, at 28, 31; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1301 (ac-
knowledging the difficult nature of detecting a former methamphetamine lab by stating in
the findings that "[i]nnocent members of the public may be harmed when they are un-
knowingly exposed to... residues" left after the manufacture of methamphetamine) (em-
phasis added). Other statutes may not explicitly refer to the lack of knowledge surround-
ing purchase of former methamphetamine labs, but there are implied references to notice
or disclosure provisions within these statutes because they are directed at remedying the
lack of knowledge. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(F) (Supp. 2005) (requiring
notice to prospective buyers or lessees until current owner cleans up the property and
providing prospective buyers or lessees with option to cancel the purchase or rental
agreement if the current owner does not comply with the notice requirement).
In some cases, presence of a potential contamination problem may be obvious, even to
an untrained observer. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-30-305(B)(4)(a)-(e) (recognizing
"areas highly suggestive of contamination" to include stained furniture, flooring, and ap-
pliances); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41D.0102(4) (2005) (recognizing that initial visual as-
sessment of property can be useful to signal methamphetanine contamination when there
are chemical spills, chemical odors, or stains); ARK. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CLANDESTINE METHAMPHETAMINE LABORATORY CLEANUP GUIDELINES 5 (2006),
http://www.healthyarkansas.com/pdf/adhmethguidelines-2005.pdf (noting that assessment
of property for "visibly stained, discolored or etched fixtures" will aid in the identification
of methamphetamine contamination). However, confirmation that a property is contami-
nated by methamphetamine and its chemical residue from the manufacturing process is left
to those who are trained to detect the contamination. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R4-
30-305(A)(1)-(4) (2005) (explaining that the scope of contamination is determined by an
on-site supervisor's assessment of law enforcement records and any other information
relevant to the nature of the contamination in addition to conducting "appropriate testing
for corrosive, flammable, combustible, and toxic atmospheres during the initial entry in the
residually contaminated portion of the real property"). For example, Arizona has enacted
regulations mandating that testing be conducted by certified professionals both before and
after the methamphetamine contamination is detected and cleaned. Id. § R4-30-
305(A)(3)-(4), (C)(1)-(4). The decision to require a trained professional to assess a prop-
erty for decontamination is likely based on the professional equipment required for testing
and the potential danger of exposure to chemicals by those who are untrained to handle
them. See id. § R4-30-305(A)(3)(c) ("The on-site supervisor shall... [w]ear the appropri-
ate personal protective equipment for the condition(s) assessed"); id. § R4-30-305(A)(4)
(inspection conducted using "LEIO2 meter, pH paper, PID, FID, or equivalent equip-
ment"); id. § R4-30-305(C)(4)(f) ("All testing equipment shall be properly equipped and
calibrated for the types of compounds to be analyzed.").
26. Hannan, supra note 20, at 31 ("The approach and level of effort necessary to
decontaminate a home varies significantly .... Where allowed to self-perform the decon-
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especially prior to the new reporting requirements that are being adopted
27by states.
Hazardous residue from methamphetamine manufacture must be re-
moved because of the harmful health effects and environmental pollu-
tion2 associated with exposure to methamphetamine and its chemical by-
products.29 With the cost of methamphetamine cleanup running in the
thousands and sometimes tens of thousands of dollars,3" both property
tamination, the author is aware of cases in which homeowners have hosted a 'cleaning
party' with family and friends-an unregulated activity that presents potential hazards to
those not trained to identify and protect themselves from chemical and drug residue expo-
sure."); Rineheart, supra note 9 (stating that homeowners at a public hearing on a pro-
posed county ordinance in North Dakota declared that they would rather clean their prop-
erty "themselves rather than alert the authorities" that their property was used as a
methamphetamine lab). As Hannon describes, methamphetamine manufacture will likely
result in detectable gases or odors in the air and noticeable stains on walls and carpets.
Hannan, supra note 20, at 28-29. However, gases may dissipate over time if a "home has
been well ventilated." Id. at 29. Also, carpets can be removed, and walls can be repainted.
See Rineheart, supra note 9. This does not mean that the toxic chemicals or the danger
from exposure to the toxic chemicals has been removed. See Hannan, supra note 20, at 29-
31 (describing more extensive process for removal of hazardous chemicals); Russell, supra
note 9 (citing government affairs director for the Idaho Association of Realtors who ex-
plained that the extent of the cleanup depends on the extent of the contamination, and
quoting the owner of an environmental cleanup firm who detailed the extent of the profes-
sional cleaning process).
27. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(F) (requiring notice to prospective
buyers or lessees until current owner cleans up the property and providing prospective
buyers or lessees with option to cancel the purchase or rental agreement if the current
owner does not comply with the notice requirement). For an example of one way in which
Washington State publicizes methamphetamine contaminated properties, see Washington
State Department of Health, List of Sites Contaminated by Clandestine Drug Labs,
http://www.doh.wa.gov/ehp/ts/CDL/cdlsitelist.xls (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) (listing over
2000 properties contaminated by methamphetamine in the state of Washington).
28. See Hannan, supra note 20, at 24-25. Although studies are not conclusive as to the
exact health effects that result from exposure to methamphetamine and its by-products,
id., the individual chemicals involved have been associated with health effects such as
respiratory problems and skin irritation. See Washington State Department of Health,
Illegal Methamphetamine Labs, http://www.doh.wa.gov/ehp/ts/CDL/MethFS.htm. (last
visited Aug. 28, 2006) (matching the symptoms that the Needhams and others have experi-
enced upon moving into a former methamphetamine lab); see also Jerome et al., supra
note 1, at 52-54 (discussing the symptoms the Needhams and others experienced).
29. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-10-2(b)-(f). The West Virginia Legislature, when it
enacted the Methamphetamine Laboratory Eradication Act, cited the health and envi-
ronmental problems associated with methamphetamine production before stating, "[t]hat
it is in the best interest of every West Virginian to develop a viable solution to address the
growing methamphetamine problem in the State of West Virginia." Id.; see also Hannan,
supra note 20, at 24-25; Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 52-53.
30. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-10-2(e) ("[The] average remediation cost [is] five thou-
sand dollars."); Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 53. Some states make a list of environmental
cleanup firms available to their residents. See, e.g., Washington State Department of
Health, Washington State Department of Health Decontamination Contractors,
http://www.doh.wa.gov/ehp/ts/CDLiCDLContractorList.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2006).
2006]
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owners and states are reluctant to bear the burden of the cleanup costs."
Therein lies the problem: no one wants to bear the burden of cleaning up
toxic methamphetamine lab waste.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze state legislation that re-
sponds to the dangers of toxic chemical exposure from former metham-
phetamine laboratories in residential real property due to the rising use
of methamphetamine by focusing on the potential for innocent property
owners and subsequent purchasers to be left with the cleanup bill. First,
this Comment discusses the tension in property law between individual
property owners and states, which is highlighted in constitutional takings
jurisprudence. Second, this Comment reviews current federal and state
legislation designed for the cleanup of environmental contamination to
illustrate how contamination has been dealt with prior to the enactment
of specific methamphetamine statutes. Third, this Comment compares
legislation from a selection of states that requires property owners to
clean up methamphetamine waste and analyzes the burden placed on
property owners to determine whether the legislation amounts to a regu-
latory taking of their property. Finally, this Comment argues that regula-
tions requiring property owners to bear the costs of cleanup could
amount to a taking, but in order to provide more certain protection for
property owners, state legislatures that are implicated should amend their
legislation to reflect the language proposed in this Comment.
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ARTICULATING
THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROPERTY OWNER
A. From Pennsylvania Coal Co. to Tahoe: Regulatory Takings Jurispru-
dence in the United States Supreme Court Involves a Balancing Act
Because the focus of this Comment is on particular statutory regula-
tions dealing with the cleanup of methamphetamine residue, the analysis
will follow regulatory takings jurisprudence. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, the Supreme Court concluded that the protection afforded prop-
erty owners in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment covered not
only physical takings of property, but also regulatory takings, when it
struck down a Pennsylvania statute "forbid[ding] the mining of anthracite
coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of... any structure used as a
However, a quick search of one of the firms did not reveal the exact cost; the website only
revealed that the firm is committed to providing "cost-effective" service. See Kleen Envi-
ronmental Technologies, Inc., About KET, http://www.kleenenvironmental.com/docs/
about.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). Another search of a firm serving the Western
United States achieved the same result: the firm explained on its website that it provided
service at "competitive prices." See Meth Lab Cleanup Company, The Company,
http://www.methlabcleanup.com/company.html (last visited Aug. 28,2006).
31. See Rineheart, supra note 9.
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human habitation. 32  In setting down the "general rule ... that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking,"33 the Court reasoned that the coal mining
statute violated the Takings Clause because the statute went "too far.,
3 4
Pennsylvania's asserted interest in providing protection to the public by
preventing damage to structures from subsidence of land above coal min-
ing operations was insufficient to justify the interference with the rights
of property owners because the danger sought to be avoided threatened
the property owners themselves.35 Concluding its analysis in invalidating
the statute, the Court cited the economic interest in coal mining and de-
termined that because the statute interfered with this interest, the statute
constituted a taking."
Almost sixty years later, the Court returned to the takings inquiry in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,37 reviewing the history
of the Court's takings jurisprudence and conceding that the Court "has
been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when" a taking
has occurred. 38 The Court explained that the analysis in a takings inquiry
32. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412-13,415 (1922).
33. Id. at 415.
34. Id. at 413-15. The Court further explained that it was not invalidating the statute
as applied, but rather on the statute's face, stating:
If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it
clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so exten-
sive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights.
But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the act should
be discussed.... It seems, therefore, to be our duty to go farther in the statement of
our opinion, in order that it may be known at once, and that further suits should not
be brought in vain.
Id. at 414.
35. Id. at 413-16. To illustrate the difference when a "regulation goes too far," from
when it does not, the Court distinguished the statute in Pennsylvania Coal Co, from that of
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914). Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
The Court concluded that the statute in Plymouth preventing coal mining within a certain
distance from the surface of the property line was a valid exercise of the police power of
the legislature because the statute was directed at mine safety for employees working in
the mine, id., as opposed to use of the police power to protect the "personal safety" of a
property owner or the maintenance of a "single private house." Id. at 413-14.
36. Id. at 414-15.
37. 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
38. Id. at 124. Over the years, scholars and practitioners have also attempted to tackle
the meaning of Holmes' "general rule" in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Gideon Kan-
ner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 653, 656 (2005) ("Unfor-
tunately, courts have failed to draw any sort of discernable line separating [a legitimate
regulation and one that goes 'too far'], shuttling unpredictably between competing doc-
trines and producing conflicting results."); William W. Wade, "Sophistical and Abstruse
Formulas" Made Simple, Or: Advances in Measurement of Penn Central's Economic
Prongs and Estimation of Economic Damages in Federal Claims and Circuit Courts, SLO12
2006]
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necessarily involves a case by case balancing of factors including "[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations," as well as "the character of the governmental ac-
tion."39 In applying these factors to a New York City zoning ordinance
protecting historic landmarks, the Supreme Court concluded that Penn
Central's interest in contracting to build a multi-story office building
above Grand Central Terminal did not outweigh the city's interest in
preserving Grand Central Terminal as a designated historic landmark. 4
The analysis established in Penn Central became the Court's standard
41
for determining whether or not a regulatory taking existed, no matter
what categorization was given to the regulation at issue, whether "tempo-
rary" or "permanent." 42 The Court's decision in First English Evangelical
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COURSE OF STUDY 303, 358 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Wade, COURSE OF STUDY) ("How far is 'too far' has haunted Takings Jurisprudence
since Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922)."). Scholars have also criticized the analysis
provided in Penn Central for the same reason; the test is one that is not easily applied to a
regulatory takings issue. Kanner, supra at 655-56; William W. Wade, Penn Central's Eco-
nomic Failings Confounded Takings Jurisprudence, 31 URB. LAW. 277, 277-81, 308 (1999)
(describing the conflict between economic theory and legal language in the Penn Central
balancing factors); Wade, COURSE OF STUDY, supra, 306-09 (calling for "guideposts" in
regulatory takings analysis).
39. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. In doing so, the Court revisited its opin-
ion in Pennsylvania Coal Co., naming it the "leading case" to illustrate a regulation that
interfered with "distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking."' Id. at
127.
40. Id. at 115-16, 130-38.
41. Justice O'Connor named Penn Central the "polestar" of regulatory takings juris-
prudence in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 306-07, 314-22 (1987) (finding that an interim land use regulation preventing property
owner from constructing buildings on property in flood hazard area was a potentially com-
pensable taking despite the temporary nature of the land use restriction; "just compensa-
tion" cannot be effected simply by repealing regulation). Even though the Court in First
English Evangelical focused primarily on the issue of whether or not "just compensation"
should have been paid to the church for the temporary taking, see id. at 306-07, 314-17, the
Court emphasized, "'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings." Id. at 318. Despite the
Court's focus in the case, the Court acknowledged that the preliminary inquiry in a tempo-
rary takings problem still revolves around whether or not the "regulation goes too far."
See id. at 306-07, 316, 318-19 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
Therefore, although the Court reviewed a "temporary taking," the initial takings analysis
remained the same. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-40 (2005).
A form of the Penn Central analysis was also used in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, for a "total taking" inquiry. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1007-09, 1019, 1030 (1992) (finding that a statute directed at preventing beach erosion and
protecting sand dunes prevented property owner from building on residential lots pur-
chased for constructing single-family homes was a "total taking" because the statute ren-
dered the property "valueless"). The Court, in analyzing the particular taking at issue in
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Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles was the first to address
whether or not a "temporary taking" qualifies for "just compensation"
under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution . In First
English Evangelical, the Court determined that a property owner seeking
monetary compensation could bring a claim for a temporary taking be-
cause the emergency safety ordinance at issue restricted the use of the
property owner's land." The Court reviewed the language of the Fifth
Amendment and concluded that the language did not prevent the gov-
ernment from taking private property, but required payment for its use.45
The Court recognized the burden that the Takings Clause places on the
government in the government's ability to freely conduct its business
when it is required to compensate private owners for the government's
use of private land. 46 Yet the Court dismissed this burden without con-
cern when it reiterated its position in Pennsylvania Coal Co.: "'[A] strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change.' ', 7 In other words, the government's interest in regula-
tion does not change its obligation to pay private property owners when
the Takings Clause is implicated.4 '8 Based on the Court's determination
that a temporary taking was compensable under the Takings Clause, the
county could be required to pay for the value of its use of the property
owner's land during the period that the landowner was restricted by the
emergency safety ordinance.49
In 2002, the Supreme Court revisited First English Evangelical when it
determined that a thirty-two month moratorium on property develop-
ment designed to allow the state legislatures of California and Nevada to
implement legislation to protect Lake Tahoe did not amount to a regula-
tory taking in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency."O The property owners argued that First English Evan-
Lucas, developed a new "'total taking' inquiry," id. at 1030-31, involving the application of
existing state common law nuisance actions to a property owner's reasonable interests in
his property. Id. at 1027-32. However, in practice the "total taking" inquiry is similar to
the test set out in Penn Central because a type of balancing is still required. See id. at 1016
n.7, 1019 n.8, 1032 n.18; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-40; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1047
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. See First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 310 (noting that previous attempts to
reach the merits of the temporary takings questions were prevented by procedural obsta-
cles in those cases).
44. Id. at 314-20.
45. Id. at 314-15.
46. Id. at 321.
47. Id. at 321-22 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922)).
48. See id. at 321-22.
49. See id. at 322.
50. 535 U.S. 302, 306-09, 341-43 (2002).
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gelical applied, asserting that the Court's holding stood for the proposi-
tion that a moratorium on property development constituted a per se
taking.5 The Court rejected the per se takings analysis proposed by the
property owners. In doing so, the Court reminded the property owners
that First English Evangelical did not decide whether a taking had oc-
curred, merely that if a taking had occurred, it would require compensa-
tion despite its temporary nature.53 Further, the Court explained that the
property owners' dependence on a per se takings rule was misplaced be-
cause of the rarity of finding a per se taking in a case involving a chal-
14lenged regulation. Instead, the Penn Central test remained the appro-
priate method for determining whether the moratorium on development
constituted a regulatory taking.55 Again, the Court emphasized that regu-
latory takings jurisprudence rests on the particular facts of the case, and
emphasized that this meant a regulatory takings analysis could go "one
way or the other" depending on the facts of a particular case.56 In Tahoe,
the analysis determined that a taking had not occurred.57
Continuing along the line of Pennsylvania Coal Co. and Penn Central
Transportation Co., balancing the interests of the government in regulat-
ing use of property against the economic interests of the property owner
in the use of his property, the Court set out further characterizations of
takings, each with unique forms of analysis, yet all employing some form
58of a balancing test. In First English Evangelical, the Court determined
51. Id. at 320-21.
52. Id. at 321.
53. Id. at 328-29.
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id. at 321.
56. Id. at 326-27, 337.
57. Id. at 334, 342-43. The Court suggested the outcome may have been different had
the property owners brought their takings claims as separate "as applied" challenges. Id.
at 334. This was because the facial challenge to the moratorium required the property
owners to rely on a per se takings analysis and prevented them from developing the facts
that would be applied to a Penn Central analysis. Id. at 334-35.
58. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-40 (2005). In writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor surveyed the course of takings jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court and concluded:
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified,
these .. , inquiries... share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government di-
rectly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accord-
ingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that govern-
ment imposes upon private property rights.
Id. at 539 (emphasis added). Therefore, over the course of takings jurisprudence the tests
have basically the same balance of government interests versus private interests at their
core. See id. at 538-39.
The reason that the Court in Lingle reviewed the history of the takings analysis was to
determine if a "legitimate state interests" test could also be used to determine if a regula-
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that it was possible for a regulation temporarily depriving a property
owner of the economic interest in the use of his property to amount to a
taking." In Tahoe, the Court determined the same thing-that it was
possible for a regulation temporarily depriving a property owner of the
economic interest in the use of his property to amount to a taking.
6
0
Given the different outcomes in regulatory takings cases, and because the
factual inquiry required of a regulatory takings case could mean that the
outcome will go "one way or the other,, 61 it is difficult to predict when a
regulatory taking has occurred.62  What is clear is that within regulatory
tory taking existed. See id. at 540-45. After reviewing the history of the Court's takings
jurisprudence, the Court noted that the "legitimate state interests" test was a product of
the Court's due process jurisprudence. Id. at 540. The Court further noted that much of
the case law contained a "commingling of due process and takings inquiries," id. at 541, but
concluded that the problem with using a due process analysis to answer a takings inquiry
was not only because it added confusion in an already confusing area, see id. at 542 (admit-
ting that "regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified"), but also
because the due process analysis was inadequate to answer the takings inquiry. Id. The
Court stated, "the 'substantially advances [legitimate state interests]' inquiry reveals noth-
ing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon
private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory
burden is distributed among property owners." Id.
Because of the shortcomings of the "legitimate state interests" test as applied to a regu-
latory takings claim, the Court concluded that it was no longer appropriate for evaluation
of takings claims. Id. at 540, 542. The Court further attempted to separate the due process
inquiry from the takings inquiry by explaining that a finding of a violation of due process
because the means and ends of the government regulation do not fit does not necessarily
mean that private property has been taken:
The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate
state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a prop-
erty subject to an ineffective regulation. It would make little sense to say that the sec-
ond owner has suffered a taking while the first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regu-
lation may not significantly burden property rights at all, and it may distribute any
burden broadly and evenly among property owners. The notion that such a regula-
tion nevertheless "takes" private property for public use merely by virtue of its inef-
fectiveness or foolishness is untenable.
Id. at 543. Therefore, when the Court in Lingle traced the history of its takings jurispru-
dence, it reasserted the appropriateness of the "Penn Central inquiry" for regulatory tak-
ings challenges. See id. at 538-40 (explaining that "regulatory takings challenges are gov-
erned by the standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978)"). This was because the elements of the Penn Central test answered the ques-
tions essential to a takings challenge-"the magnitude or character of the burden," id. at
542, imposed on property owners. See id. at 538-40, 542, 548.
59. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304,306-07, 314-22 (1987).
60. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 333-35,341-42.
61. Id. at 337.
62. Compare id. at 341-43, with id. at 343-46 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (illustrating
that a different interpretation of the facts as applied to the Penn Central analysis would
achieve different results, i.e., a finding that a taking occurred versus a finding that a taking
had not occurred).
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takings jurisprudence there is a constant tension between what is re-
quired of the government and what is required of the property owner.
63
If the interests of the government are greater than the interests of the
property owner, then the property owner loses the takings claim. Ulti-
mately, the deciding factor is the underlying protection that the Takings
Clause affords-that individual property owners should be compensated
for burdens they bear for "'the public as a whole."'65
B. Liability of Property Owners to Clean Up Environmental Contami-
nants: CERCLA and its State Counterparts
Under current federal and state environmental law, the government
can constitutionally require property owners to pay for the costs of the
cleanup of hazardous material on their property, provided that certain
statutory conditions are met.66 In 1980, Congress enacted the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) in order to provide a legislative scheme for the cleanup and
removal of hazardous waste sites.6 The goals of the Act were to protect
the public from exposure to hazardous waste, and to identify and hold
liable those who are responsible for the dangerous disposal of hazardous
waste. 68 CERCLA provides liability for present and past owners of prop-
63. Compare First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 321 ("[M]any of the provisions of
the Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authori-
ties, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them."), with
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 339-42 (citing "[t]he interest in facilitating
informed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies" as reason to uphold the development
moratorium as constitutional).
64. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("A 'tak-
ing' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.") (internal citation omitted).
65. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24).
66. See Asarco Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 43 P.3d 471, 472 (Wash. 2002) (stating that
environmental cleanup actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) "ha[ve] been vigorously litigated in state and
federal courts, and ha[ve] been consistently upheld as constitutional"). Asarco Inc. itself
involved a challenge to Washington's state counterpart to the federal law that also sur-
vived constitutional challenge. See id. at 477 (finding the case not ripe for review); infra
notes 95-100 and accompanying text (summarizing the case).
67. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see also H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17-18
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20.
68. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17-18 ("The unfortunate human health and
environmental consequence of [current hazardous waste disposal] practices has received
national attention amidst growing public and Congressional concern over the magnitude of
the problem and the appropriate course of response that should be pursued. Existing law
is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem."); see also Diane H. Nowak,
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erty that has been designated a hazardous waste site under the statute,
and who, when identified, are strictly liable for costs incurred by the fed-
eral government for cleaning up the hazardous waste.69 Cleanup costs
associated with liability under CERCLA have amounted to thousands
and even millions of dollars.70 The primary targets of CERCLA liability
are larger corporations and owners of commercial real estate" who are
expected to bear the burden of cleanup costs7 2 because at the time
CERCLA was enacted, Congress found that corporations were the pri-
mary hazardous waste producers.73 However, the language of CERCLA
Comment, CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: The Rising Standard of Environ-
mental Due Diligence for Real Estate Transactions, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 827, 827 (1990) (dis-
cussing legislative history of CERCLA in response to contamination at Love Canal and
the purpose CERCLA was designed to achieve).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(C), 9607(a) (2000); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985); H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 1, 17; Judith G. Tracy,
Beyond Caveat Emptor: Disclosure to Buyers of Contaminated Land, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
169, 176 (1991); Nowak, supra note 68, at 827-28 (describing scope of liability as "broad").
70. Tracy, supra note 69, at 171 ("Although contamination at some sites is minor, the
cleanup costs of major sites may be as high as $1 million per acre, and the total cost ... of
contaminated land must be measured by more than cleanup dollars."); Nowak, supra note
68, at 830-31 (noting potential "individual cleanup costs ranging from 10 to 100 billion
dollars").
71. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18-21 (listing hazardous waste contamination
issues created by-among others and with specific company names-chemical companies,
the radium industry, and waste disposal companies).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (Supp. III 2003) (providing lower standard for acquiring
knowledge of history of property under CERCLA for a "'bona fide prospective pur-
chaser"' if property used for residential purposes); Nowak, supra note 68, at 843 (noting
that expectations placed on commercial property owners are "more rigorous" than those
placed on others because of the ability to participate in "arms-length transactions"). In
addition, commercial owners of property may be more easily capable of negotiating con-
tribution for cleanup costs from prior owners before liability under CERCLA even be-
comes an issue. See Nowak, supra note 68, at 837 (citing case law that permits parties to
include liability costs for environmental cleanup in a purchase agreement, but requires the
agreement to include express language regarding the environmental liability). Or, the
government in a contribution action to recover its costs for initially cleaning up the envi-
ronmental waste under CERCLA may seek recovery from only "a few deep pockets,"
which would likely include commercial property owners. Id. at 836.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 2, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6151,
6153 (drafting provisions of CERCLA that would require industrial producers of hazard-
ous waste to pay an excise tax that would fund hazardous waste cleanup, the House Ways
and Means Committee wrote: "The committee recognizes that the United States Govern-
ment must bear some of the costs incurred for this purpose. However, it also believes that
these costs generally should be borne by the party responsible for the waste, and alterna-
tively by the industries which create the items most frequently located in inactive waste
sites"). These measures, designed to place extensive liability on property owners contrib-
uting to the spread of hazardous waste contamination in the United States, were taken
after Congress found that hazardous waste sites were a formidable problem. See H.R.
REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18-21 ("The United States Environmental Protection Agency
has conducted a study to determine the number of inactive and uncontrolled hazardous
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does not limit liability to corporations or owners of commercial real es-
tate, rather the Act imposes liability on "any person" who falls within one
of the enumerated categories.74
Challenges to CERCLA by property owners designated by the gov-
ernment to bear the cleanup costs for hazardous waste disposal are often
unsuccessful, 7 with courts often narrowly construing the defenses that
CERCLA provides.76 Specifically, a challenge to CERCLA liability as an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment is among those de-
fenses that have failed.77 For example, in United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,78 the Eighth Circuit first questioned the
defendant chemical corporation's standing to bring a takings claim be-
cause the corporation was not the current owner of the property in ques-
tion, and afterwards rejected the takings claim on its merits. 79 The court
determined that the required cleanup protected the health and safety of
the public "and restor[ed] value to the property by removing the hazard-
ous substances. ' 80 Therefore the takings claim against the government
could not be sustained.81 Similarly, in United States v. Asarco Inc.,8 the
Idaho federal district court adopted the takings analysis from Northeast-
waste sites in existence. In 1979, the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 sites
existed, of which between 1,200-2,000 present a serious risk to public health. Irrespective
of which available or projected statistics are relied upon, the need for a strong legislative
response is evident." (emphasis added)). One of the locations cited by Congress as an area
of significant concern to public health and safety was Love Canal, where disposal of or-
ganic chemicals in a landfill was linked to miscarriages, birth defects and other serious
injuries to nearby residents, the legacy of which contributed to Congress' exacting crack-
down on hazardous waste producers. See id. at 19-21. Congress recognized that the pub-
lic's reaction to hazardous waste sites like Love Canal and the potential for additional sites
demanded federal intervention. See id. at 20-21 ("Public opposition to new sites, caused by
improper disposal in the past, is growing. Until such opposition can be lessened by dem-
onstrating that hazardous wastes can be disposed of safely, future sites may have to be
located on Federal and State lands.").
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). Scholars and practitioners have realized that
CERCLA liability is so broad that it would be difficult to conclusively determine that a
particular property owner with hazardous waste contamination on his property would not
be liable under CERCLA. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 600
(5th ed. 2002) (citing Nowak, supra note 68; Tracy, supra note 69).
75. Asarco Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 43 P.3d 471, 472 (Wash. 2002) ("CERCLA has
been vigorously litigated in state and federal courts, and has been consistently upheld as
constitutional.").
76. See Nowak, supra note 68, at 837-44.
77. See United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Asarco Inc., No. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, 1999 WL 33313132, at *1, *6-7 (D.
Idaho Sept. 30, 1999).
78. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 726.
79. Id. at 734.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Asarco Inc., 1999 WL 33313132, at *1.
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ern Pharmaceutical in rejecting a mining corporation's claims that imposi-
tion of CERCLA liability for hazardous waste cleanup constituted a
regulatory taking of its property. Further, even though the district court
concluded that a full takings analysis was not warranted in a CERCLA
case, it applied CERCLA liability to the Penn Central test. 1 The court
determined that the mining corporation's liability under CERCLA did
not constitute a regulatory taking because the economic impact of the
liability was not severe, and it did not interfere with investment backed
expectations when it was imposed on the parties responsible for the con-
tamination."' In addition, the court reasoned that the nature of the gov-
ernment action involved a valid regulation for the protection of public
health and safety.86 Therefore, liability under CERCLA withstood con-
stitutional attack under the Takings Clause, in large part because liability
under CERCLA is directed at those who created the need for the envi-
ronmental cleanup.87
Not long after CERCLA was enacted, states began adopting similar
legislation to deal with the threat of hazardous waste contamination. In
83. Id. at *6-7.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *7.
86. Id.
87. See id. at *6-7. The court also rejected the mining company's contention that the
economic impact of CERCLA was severe because other hazardous waste contributors
could have contributed to the contamination on the grounds that CERCLA provides a
property owner designated as a liable party under CERCLA with "a right of contribution."
Id. at *7. This would allow the property owner to seek compensation from the other haz-
ardous waste contributors. Id.
88. See Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSAA), CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-01 (West 2006) (enacted in 1981, repealed and added
in 1999, the HSAA is considered to be the California "state[] counterpart to CERCLA."
City of Lodi v. Randtron, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 107, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)); Industrial Site
Recovery Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1k-6 to -35 (West 2003) (enacted in 1983, also known
as the Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act); Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA), TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.001-.912 (Vernon 2001 & Supp.
2006) (enacted in 1969, amended in 1981 and 1991); Model Toxics Control Act, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105D.010-.921 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (enacted in 1988).
Nearly all fifty states have adopted legislation similar to CERCLA, either having adopted
it prior to CERCLA or in response to CERCLA. Tod I. Zuckerman et al., Representing
Buyers, Sellers, and Lenders in Transferring Contaminated Property: A Primer for Real
Estate Practitioners Part 1, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 305, 319-22 (2000); see also Wil-
liam D. Turkula, Determining Cleanup Standards for Hazardous Waste Sites, 135 MIL. L.
REV. 167, 171 (1992); Quinn Scallon, Comment, Hazardous Waste: Liability of Predeces-
sors in Title, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 101 (1992). These individual state statutes vary in
their similarity to CERCLA, but liability under the state statutes must be at least as "strin-
gent" as CERCLA to avoid federal preemption. Zuckerman et al., supra, at 319-22
("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous
substances within such State." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994))) (emphasis added).
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1988, Washington State enacted its own hazardous waste removal legisla-
tion drafted in the image of CERCLA,' the Model Toxics Control Act
(MTCA). 9°  The MTCA created procedural provisions similar to
CERCLA in terms of cleaning up toxic waste."' Under the MTCA, the
state government identifies hazardous waste sites and either requires cur-
rent property owners to clean up the waste, or the government cleans up
the waste and seeks reimbursement from the parties it determines to be
responsible. 9 Property owners who fall within the scope of the MTCA
are held strictly liable for costs associated with cleanup. 9
The MTCA, like CERCLA, has been able to withstand constitutional
challenge 94 by those who have been designated by the Washington State
government as "potentially liable persons" for payment of cleanup
costs.95 Asarco Inc. v. Department of Ecology-* involved a case brought
by an owner of commercial property against the Washington Department
of Ecology for a declaration that the MTCA as applied to the property
owner was unconstitutional.97 The Washington Supreme Court deter-
mined that the property owner's constitutional claims were not ripe, and
thus the case was not justiciable." In making this determination, the
court reviewed the analysis of the property owner's claim that the MTCA
89. Asarco Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 43 P.3d 471, 472 (Wash. 2002) ("MTCA was
modeled on CERCLA . . . [therefore] CERCLA case law [is] persuasive in interpreting
MTCA."); City of Seattle (Seattle City Light) v. Wash. State Dep't of Transp., 989 P.2d
1164, 1168 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F.
Supp. 1339, 1343 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (order denying defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion) (analyzing MTCA "language identical in substance to CERCLA's ... provision[s]");
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 15 P.3d 115, 120 (Wash. 2001) (outlining
statutory requirements for CERCLA and MTCA).
90. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105D.010-.910.
91. See Asarco Inc., 43 P.3d at 472.
92. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.020(12) (defining "owner or operator" of
property in question); id. § 70.105D.020(16) (defining "potentially liable person" as a per-
son found liable by "credible evidence" under 70.105D.040); id. §§ 70.105D.030-.050 (out-
lining government's jurisdiction for investigation, cleanup, and enforcement and the prop-
erty owner's liability); Asarco Inc., 43 P.3d at 472.
93. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.040(2) ("Each person who is liable under this
section is strictly liable, jointly and severally, for all remedial action costs and for all natu-
ral resource damages resulting from the releases or threatened releases of hazardous sub-
stances. The attorney general, at the request of the department, is empowered to recover
all costs and damages from persons liable therefor."); Asarco Inc., 43 P.3d at 472.
94. The MTCA has also been construed to avoid constitutional challenges. See Car
Wash Enters., Inc. v. Kampanos, 874 P.2d 868, 872-73 & n.4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (con-
struing MTCA to avoid conflict with Contracts Clause in the United States Constitution,
Article I, Section 10, and the Washington State Constitution, article I, section 23, by allow-
ing parties who foresee potential MTCA liability to allocate liability by private contract).
95. See generally Asarco Inc., 43 P.3d at 472-77.
96. Id. at 471.
97. Id. at 474.
98. Id. at 477.
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violated the Takings Clause by reviewing the factors of the Penn Central
test.99 The court asserted that it could not apply this test because the eco-
nomic impact on the property owner and the extent of interference with
"investment-backed expectations" were not known without the Depart-
ment of Ecology having filed an enforcement or contribution action un-
der the MTCA.1 0 Because the takings analysis was already foreclosed by
the majority's narrow interpretation of the court's ability to review the
property owner's takings claim, the MTCA survived constitutional chal-
lenge.01
C. State Regulation of Methamphetamine Decontamination
Just as CERCLA and its state counterparts were enacted in response to
growing concern over the dangers and extent of the problem of hazard-
ous waste contamination,1 °2 methamphetamine cleanup statutes have
99. Id. at 476. The court in Asarco did not cite Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) for this test. Instead, it attributed the language to
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986), but Connolly
itself quotes from Penn Central. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225; Asarco Inc., 43 P.3d at 476.
100. Asarco Inc., 43 P.3d at 476.
101. See id. at 481 (Sanders, J., dissenting). In a lengthy dissent of the majority's opin-
ion in Asarco, Judge Sanders agreed with the trial court's ruling that the challenge to the
MTCA was ripe for review and that the MTCA violated the Takings and Due Process
Clauses. Id. at 477. In his analysis of the Takings Clause, Sanders argued that the majority
narrowly applied a ripeness review to a takings challenge because ripeness review should
only be applicable to regulations imposing "use restrictions," not regulations imposing a
"direct imposition of monetary liability." Id. at 482-83 (demonstrating that even if ripeness
were an issue, an enforcement action should not be the measure of ripeness, but rather
ripeness should be determined by the fact that the status of the property owner had al-
ready been affected by the MTCA when the Department of Ecology named the company
as a "potentially liable person"). After dividing the types of takings into two prongs of
analysis, one where the government "'does not advance legitimate state interests"' and the
other where the government denies "'an owner [of] economically viable use of his land,"'
Sanders analyzed the property owner's takings claim within the "legitimate state interests"
prong. Id. at 484 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). This was
because the property owner asserted that the regulation was "not constitutionally permis-
sible at all, even with compensation." Id. Judge Sanders agreed with the trial court in its
disposition of the property owner's "claims [that] remediation of th[e] site affords an af-
firmative public benefit, and should not prompt a burden.., to be uniquely imposed on
[the property owner's] shoulders." Id. 484-88. Among other reasons, Sanders noted the
potential $78,000,000 cost of cleanup and the fact that the property owner was required "to
pay 100 percent of the cost to cure a problem for which it was at most 30 percent responsi-
ble" as evidence that a regulatory taking existed. Id. at 485-87.
Even if the majority had followed Sanders' analysis in Asarco Inc., the conclusion that
application of the MTCA effected a regulatory taking would not have been good law inso-
far as it was based on application of the "legitimate state interests" test. The Supreme
Court recently ruled that the "legitimate state interests" test is inappropriate for analysis
of a regulatory takings claim. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18-21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120-23 (citing concern for dangerous conditions caused by present and future haz-
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been enacted in response to growing concern over the dangers and extent
of the problem of hazardous waste contamination caused by the manufac-
ture of methamphetamne. 3 State methamphetamine statutes range
from imposing a requirement on property owners to clean up the affected
property and to disclose the history of its contamination,' to solely im-
posing a disclosure requirement. 5 Some states create guidelines, which
allow for voluntary cleanup of the affected property.' °6 Variation exists in
the approach that each state takes to combat the hazardous residue left
ardous waste sites); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25301 (West 2006) (stating a pur-
pose to regulate hazardous waste disposal and compensate persons injured by exposure to
hazardous waste); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1k-7 (West 2003) ("[Djue to the growing public
awareness and concern of the risks to the public health and the environment and the po-
tential costs to the State to clean up abandoned contaminated sites, the 'Environmental
Cleanup and Responsibility Act' was enacted."); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
361.002 (Vernon 2001) (stating a purpose to protect public health, welfare, and property by
controlling hazardous waste); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.010 (West Supp. 2006)
(declaring that public health and the environment are threatened by hazardous waste
contamination).
103. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1301 (2005) (citing concern for harm to the public
caused by exposure to toxic methamphetamine residue); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
64.44.005 (West 2005) (same); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-10-2 (LexisNexis 2005) (recog-
nizing the expansion of the methamphetamine problem in the United States and in West
Virginia and the injury to the public that methamphetamine use and manufacture causes).
104. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-990, 12-1000 (2003 & Supp. 2005); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-102 to -103 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-284 (West 2005)
(enabling act for administrative code provision 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41D.0101 (2005));
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-501 to -509; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.005-.901 (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
105. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.236 (Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-
1301 to -1306 (establishing voluntary cleanup guidelines, but rules for the certification of
contractors and a requirement that the owner notify a subsequent occupant or purchaser
of the property's history as a methamphetamine laboratory); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §
833(A)(2), (B)(1)(h) (West Supp. 2006) (stating that one of the allowable disclosure re-
quirements is a form including a statement of the "existence of prior manufacturing of
methamphetamine"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-4-44 (1997 & LexisNexis 2006) (providing
mandatory form for disclosure of property conditions prior to transfer in Part IV, "Haz-
ardous Conditions," and requiring disclosure of methamphetamine production and an
explanation of the condition).
106. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-132 (2005) (enabling act for the Arkansas De-
partment of Health to create voluntary cleanup guidelines); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-
1301 to -1306. (establishing voluntary cleanup guidelines, which contain rules for the certi-
fication of contractors and contain a requirement that the owner notify a subsequent occu-
pant or purchaser of the property's history as a methamphetamine laboratory); see also
IOWA BUREAU OF TOXICOLOGY, DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR CLEANING
UP FORMER METHAMPHETAMINE LABS 1, www.idph.state.ia.us/eh/common/pdf/hseess/
meth lab.cleanup.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) ("The Iowa Department of Public
Health, Bureau of Toxicology, has created these basic guidelines to assist public health
officials, property owners and the general public in cleaning up former meth lab proper-
ties" in response to a finding that over 1100 methamphetamine contaminated properties
had been discovered in Iowa in 2003).
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behind after a methamphetamine laboratory is discovered, thus this
Comment will focus on a few states as examples.
1. Washington
Washington's statutory scheme for the decontamination of residential
properties used as methamphetamine laboratories is codified separately
with respect to Washington's CERCLA counterpart, the MTCA. °7
Washington was one of the first states to enact a statute to deal with the
problems associated with methamphetamine contamination Under
Washington's statute, enforcement commences when law enforcement
officers discover contaminated property and notify the local health offi-
cer, or when a property owner suspects contamination and notifies the
local health officer. °9 Upon notification, the local health officer inspects
the property and makes a determination as to the extent of the contami-
nation, and the city or county determines whether the property requires
cleaning, or in some cases, condemnation or demolition. ° The property
owner is afforded notice of the local health officer's determination and
given a limited period in which to appeal.' However, notice is given
only after the determination has been made." In addition, if cleanup is
deemed to be required by the local health officer, the property owner
107. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 64.44.005-.901.
108. See Russell, supra note 9. Washington was one of the first states to enact this type
of legislation, most likely because of the fact that addiction to the drug began, in large part,
on the West Coast and expanded across the country. See Cazenavette Statement, supra
note 19, at 12.
109. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.020.
110. Id. §§ 64.44.020-.040. For an example of the procedure in practice, see Cagle v.
King County, 70 F. App'x 450,451-52 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.030(1). As to the timing of the hearing and
appeal process, the statute provides in relevant part:
The [property owner's] request for a hearing must be made within ten days of serving
the order. The hearing shall then be held within not less than twenty days nor more
than thirty days after the serving of the order.... The owner or any person having an
interest in the property may file an appeal on any order issued by the local health
board or officer within thirty days from the date of service of the order with the ap-
peals commission ....
Id.; see also Cagle, 70 F. App'x at 453 (describing timing of appeal).
112. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.030(1). As to the timing of the inspec-
tion and notice, the statute provides in relevant part:
If after the inspection of the property, the local health officer finds that it is contami-
nated .... [t]he local health officer shall cause the order to be served either person-
ally or by certified mail, with return receipt requested, upon all occupants and persons
having any interest therein as shown upon the records of the auditor's office of the
county in which such property is located.
Id.; see also Cagle, 70 F. App'x at 452-53.
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must use an environmental decontamination contractor certified by the
state to perform the methamphetamine decontamination.' 13
The statute does not explicitly require payment for decontamination on
the part of the property owner.114 Instead, the language of the statute
indicates that the property owner is required to pay for the cost of decon-
tamination because use of the property"5 is conditioned on the property• . 116
owner proving decontamination. Any payments received from a prop-
erty owner compensating the local health officer for requesting an inspec-
tion of his property17 or from a decontamination contractor compensat-
ing the local health officer for issuance of its certificate1 8 are collected in
an account to fund the department of health's enforcement of the stat-
ute.
119
Cagle v. King County'2° is the only case so far that has interpreted
Washington's methamphetamine statute on constitutional grounds.1
2
1
The Ninth Circuit rejected the challenge to the statute, which alleged,
among other things, that the statute denied a property owner her proce-
dural due process right to a hearing before the local department of health
113. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 64.44.050-.060.
114. See generally id. §§ 64.44.005-.901 (failing to explicitly mention that the property
owner is required to pay the cost of the cleanup).
115. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 246-205-570(6)(a)-(b) (2005). Once the local health
officer determines that a property needs to be decontaminated, an order is placed on the
property prohibiting its use. See WASH ADMIN. CODE 246-205-520(1)-(3) (promulgated
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.070).
116. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.050(1). The language of section .050 appears
to make it an option for property owners to have their property decontaminated, see id.,
but in order to effectively participate in a hearing based on the status of their property, see
id. § 64.44.030(1), or to effectively ensure that their property's decontaminated status is
recorded in the real property records, see id., decontamination is required. This is because
"the property owner has the burden of showing that the property is decontaminated." Id.
Montana's decontamination statute is similar to Washington's in that property transfer and
requirements for reporting the fact that the property is a former methamphetamine lab are
conditioned on decontamination. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1305(1)-(2), -1306(1), -
1306(3), -1306(5) (2005). Interestingly, Montana considers its decontamination statute "a
voluntary program" despite these conditions on property use and disposition in the report-
ing requirements. See id. § 75-10-1301.
117. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.020 (providing for fees to be charged to
property owners who request inspection of their property when the property owners sus-
pect it is contaminated).
118. See id. § 64.44.060(6) (providing for fees to be charged for contractor certificates).
119. See id. § 64.44.060(7) (providing for creation of a decontamination account).
120. 70 F. App'x 450 (9th Cir. 2003).
121. Based on the author's research as of October 24, 2006. As of this date, research
has also failed to turn up any interpretation of a state's methamphetamine legislation on
constitutional grounds.
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quarantined the property.22  The court upheld the constitutionality of
Washington's methamphetamine statute.' 3 The court based its decision
on the fact that the statute was a valid exercise of the protection of public
health and safety and the fact that the statute provided the owner with an
opportunity for a hearing after the authorities quarantined the prop-
erty. T2
2. Tennessee
Tennessee's methamphetamine decontamination statute is similar to
Washington's statute in that: (1) it prohibits use and habitation of prop-
erty once contamination is discovered;ln (2) it affords the property owner• 126
a method of appealing the determination; (3) it does not explicitly re-
quire the property owner to decontaminate the property, but use of the
property and removal from a quarantine list is conditioned on decon-• 127
tamlnation; and (4) it requires the property owner to use an approved
122. Cagle, 70 F. App'x at 452-53 (alleging violation of procedural due process rights by
declaring her property "unfit for occupancy without the benefit of prior notice and hear-
ing," in addition to improper prior inspection of the property).
123. Id. at 453.
124. Id. To make the determination, the court balanced the property owner's interests
against those of the government and determined that the government's interest out-
weighed those of the property owner. The court applied the test in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), which requires a balancing of the property owner's interest that is
allegedly deprived as a result of the government's action against the interests of the gov-
ernment. See Cagle, 70 F. App'x at 452 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). If the process
requested by the property owner would be "'impractical[],"' id. (quoting Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)), for the government to provide, or when balanced against the
interests of the property owner the government's interests are weightier, the property
owner's due process argument is likely to fail. Id.
After applying this balancing test to the case at bar, the Ninth Circuit noted that: (1)
even though the property owner was not entitled to a hearing before her property was
posted, she was entitled to a hearing within twenty to thirty days after the posting; (2)
Washington State (and therefore King County) had a compelling regulatory purpose in
protecting the public health and safety from the risks of methamphetamine contamination;
and (3) Washington State's interest was equal in weight to the government's interest in
other cases upholding statutes against due process challenges. Id. at 453. Interestingly,
none of the precedent cited by the court for upholding regulations against due process
challenges dealt with due process claims arising from deprivation of real property. See id.
(describing cases dealing with deprivation of "unwholesome food," a "'misbranded' ma-
chine," and a petroleum permit).
125. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-503(a)-(b) (Supp. 2005) (stating that local law
enforcement may quarantine the affected property in order to prevent injury to the public
from exposure to methamphetamine contamination).
126. See id. § 68-212-503(c)(1)-(2) ("Any person who has an interest in property quar-
antined pursuant to this section may file a petition in the [relevant] . .. court of the county
in which the property is located." The court makes a determination to lift or deny the
quarantine based on the court's review of the interested person's offer of proof.).
127. See id. §§ 68-212-503(c)-(d), -505, -507(b) (providing no explicit mention of a
cleanup requirement, but listing the property owner's showing of proper decontamination
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or certified contractor to perform the decontamination if the property
owner chooses to decontaminate the property.'9 Like the Washington
statute, the Tennessee statute provides compensation to the government
only for enforcement of the provisions of the statute.29 Under the section
entitled "Restitution," costs associated with inspection, testing, and quar-
antine are covered by a criminal statute that requires certain persons con-
victed of a drug-related felony, including methamphetamine convictions,
to make restitution to government entities for the costs of mitigating any
damage or dangerous conditions resulting from the crime.' The source
of restitution is the one major difference between Tennessee's and Wash-
ington's methamphetamine contamination statute: government entities
enforcing the Washington statute receive reimbursement generated from
enforcement of the decontamination statute itself, whereas government
entities enforcing the Tennessee statute receive reimbursement from en-
forcement of Tennessee's criminal laws.3
3. Arizona and Colorado
The respective methamphetamine decontamination statutes in Arizona
and Colorado are more specific regarding placement of the burden of
methamphetamine decontamination on property owners. Unlike
Washington's or Tennessee's statutes, which place requirements on a
property owner "who desires to have the property decontaminated,' '33
yet conditions use of the property on decontamination,13 the Arizona and
by a qualified firm as one of two reasons provided for which a quarantine can be lifted-
the other is to show that the quarantine was unwarranted in the first place, i.e., the prop-
erty was not sufficiently contaminated to warrant the quarantine).
128. See id. § 68-212-505 ("The property must remain quarantined until a certified
industrial hygienist or other person or entity named on the commissioner's list.., certifies
to the quarantining agency that the property is safe for human use.").
129. See id. § 68-212-506 (listing costs of "inspection, testing or quarantine" as covered
by the calculation of restitution for a criminal drug violation; however, cleanup costs are
not listed).
130. Id. § 39-17-417(c)(2)(B) (2003); id. § 68-212-506.
131. See id. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(B) (providing for calculation of restitution to the gov-
ernment for costs of cleaning property contaminated as a result of a criminal drug viola-
tion); id. § 68-212-506 (including restitution in methamphetamine cleanup statute for "in-
spection, testing or quarantine"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.060(7) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation) (stating that fees collected through enforcement of metham-
phetamine statute will be used for continued enforcement and administration of statute).
132. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(C) (2003 & Supp. 2005) ("The owner of the
real property shall remediate the residually contaminated portion of the real property.");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-103(1)(a) (2005) ("[Tlhe owner of any contaminated property
shall meet the cleanup standards for property established by the board.").
133. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.050(1).
134. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212-503(c)-(d), -505, -507(b); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 64.44.030(1); WASH ADMIN. CODE 246-205-520(1)-(3) (2005).
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Colorado statutes use more assertive language."' The Arizona statute
mandates that the property owner "shall remediate the residually con-
taminated portion of the real property.' 3 6 The Colorado statute man-
dates that the property owner "shall meet the cleanup standards for
property... [or] elect instead to demolish the contaminated property."'37
Further, Arizona's statute is more stringent than other state statutes by
requiring the owner to decontaminate the property within a specified
time limit.3 8 Arizona requires decontamination of the affected property
"within twelve months after the date of notice of removal."'3 9 This time
limit begins to run as soon as the methamphetamine laboratory is discov-
ered by law enforcement. 40 If a property owner fails to comply with the
Arizona time limit, he does not escape liability for cleanup costs.1 4 ' The
Arizona statute provides for the cleanup to be conducted by the govern-
ment, and afterward the state receives reimbursement by placing a lien
on the property.'42
4. Arkansas
Rather than requiring methamphetamine property cleanup as other
state statutes require, the Arkansas methamphetamine statute provides
for voluntary cleanup and establishes decontamination guidelines for law
135. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(C) ("shall"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-
103(1)(a) ("shall").
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(C).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-103(1)(a).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(C).
139. Id. The notice of removal is the document issued by law enforcement notifying
the property owner of the discovery of contamination. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
1000(A)(1) ("At the time of the discovery or arrest, [a law enforcement officer] shall de-
liver a copy of the notice of removal ... to the owner of the real property."). Colorado
requires decontamination of any affected personal property within "ten days after the date
of discovery of the laboratory or contamination," COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-103(1)(b),
but does not place a time limit on decontamination of real property. See generally id. § 25-
18.5-103(1)(a)-(b) (failing to list a time limit for real property in the section establishing a
property owner's liability for the cleanup).
140. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(A)-(C). The cleanup and notice portion of
Arizona's statute is apparently triggered by discovery of the methamphetamine laboratory
by law enforcement because it does not provide for what happens when a property owner
discovers the contamination. See generally id. The twelve month time period for decon-
tamination begins to run "after the date of notice of removal," id. § 12-1000(C), yet under
statute, the notice of removal is issued by law enforcement upon discovery of the metham-
phetamine laboratory. See id. § 12-1000(A)-(B) ("If a peace officer discovers a clandestine
drug laboratory or arrests a person . . . the peace officer: [alt the time of the discovery or
arrest, shall deliver a copy of the notice of removal pursuant to subsection B of this section
141. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(C) (noting that Arizona may later recover
costs from property owner by attaching a lien).
142. Id.
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enforcement officers and the general public. 143The statute also estab-
lishes that the guidelines "be reviewed and updated annually,"' 4 and re-
visions were recently made in 2006.145 After law enforcement has con-
ducted a "primary cleanup" of visible chemicals and manufacturing mate-
rials upon discovery of the methamphetamine laboratory in a criminal
investigation, the guidelines provide for a "secondary cleanup."' 46 Even
though the Arizona Department of Health and Human Services asserts
that the responsibility of secondary cleanup falls on the owner of the con-
taminated property, the Department of Health emphasizes that its guide-
lines do not have the force of law to require cleanup. 47 Because of the
current inability to enforce methamphetamine cleanup in Arkansas, for
those property owners who choose to clean up their contaminated prop-
erty, they are (for the most part) on their own to find a reputable and
effective environmental remediation firm and to ensure that their prop-
erty has been decontaminated within known, safe limits.'"
II. APPLICATION OF METHAMPHETAMINE DECONTAMINATION
STATUTES COULD AMOUNT TO A REGULATORY TAKING
State legislatures acknowledge that the purpose of their metham-
phetamine statutes is to protect "[i]nnocent members of the public" from
"harm[] when they are unknowingly exposed to [methamphetamine]
residues if the properties are not decontaminated prior to any subsequent
rental, sale, or use of the properties.' ' 49 The statutes fall under each
state's general police power to protect public health, safety, and wel-
143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-132(a)-(b) (2005); see also ARK. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 25, at 2 (referencing authority for creation of guidelines as
Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-7-132 (effective July 16, 2003)); IOWA BUREAU OF
TOXICOLOGY, supra note 106, at 1.
144. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-132(c); see also ARK. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 25, at 2 (referencing requirement to review and make revisions at least
once a year).
145. ARK. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 25, at 2.
146. Id. at 1-2.
147. Id. Stating in the purpose section of the guidelines:
At this time, there are no state statutes that specifically authorize state or local enti-
ties to require the cleanup of the interior of privately owned properties contaminated
by clandestine methamphetamine manufacturing activities.... The information con-
tained in this document should to be [sic] used as guidelines and are not regulations or
rules subject to enforcement.
Id.
148. See id. at 3, 5, 7-8.
149. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1301 (2005); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
64.44.005 (West 2005) ("Innocent members of the public may be harmed by the residue
left by these chemicals when the properties are subsequently rented or sold without having
been decontaminated.").
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fare. ° However, "innocent members of the public" include innocent
property owners who either unknowingly purchase property that has a
history of use as a methamphetamine laboratory' or who own property
and are unaware of its current use as a methamphetamine laboratory, and
are subsequently harmed by having to pay decontamination costs.
52
These legislatures fail to protect current innocent property owners in the
interest of protecting future innocent property owners from the harm
caused by unknowingly purchasing a former methamphetamine labora-
tory.153 The property owners who are excluded from protection may have
an "as applied" takings claim against their respective state govern-
ments.5
A. The Property Owner Pays: The Requirements Approach
Although Washington and Tennessee do not explicitly state that a
property owner must clean up his property to comply with the Washing-
ton and Tennessee statutes,155 they are the same as Arizona's and Colo-
150. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1301 ("The purpose of this part is to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare .... ").
151. See Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 52-54.
152. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that property owner incurred $38,100 in damages after subtenant manufactured metham-
phetamine on property); Graff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 P.3d 1266, 1267 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002) (finding that property owner incurred damages from cleaning up methamphetamine
residue caused by tenant and possibly others "hiding in the house"); see also Cagle v. King
County, 70 F. App'x 450, 451-53 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing a property owner who was
prevented from access to her property when law enforcement uncovered a current
methamphetamine manufacturing operation allegedly run by the property owner's son).
Although it may be disputed that the property owner in Cagle knew of the methampheta-
mine contamination because the suspected manufacturer was the property owner's son,
this was not at issue during review by the court in her due process challenge. See Answer-
ing Brief for Appellee at 4-6, Cagle v. King County, 70 F. App'x 450 (9th Cir. 2003) (No.
01-36119), 2002 WL 32146051. See generally Cagle, 70 F. App'x at 451-53 (failing to men-
tion exact source of resulting methamphetamine contamination). The County hinted in its
brief that the owner may have known about the contamination when the County stated
that the owner's son's involvement was a factor in the local health officer's determination
to quarantine the property. See Answering Brief for Appellee, supra, at 5-6.
153. See, e.g., Graff, 54 P.3d at 1267. The legislature's actions are not referenced here
to imply that the legislature was not effecting a "legitimate state interest," which would be
an appropriate analysis in a due process inquiry into the methamphetamine statutes, see
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (noting that "legitimate state inter-
ests" test was adopted from the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence and later be-
came a part of regulatory takings jurisprudence, but rejecting future use of the "legitimate
state interests" test in a takings analysis), but rather to highlight a group of property own-
ers who may have an "as applied" challenge to the methamphetamine statutes.
154. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 334 (2002) (noting that it is easier to develop facts for a regulatory takings claim in an
"as applied" challenge than a facial challenge to a regulation).
155. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-505 (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
64.44.050(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); supra notes 114-16, 127 (discussing
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rado's because they require a property owner to clean up his property
after methamphetamine contamination is discovered.1 16 The issue, then,
is whether the statutes that require the property owner to pay for the
costs of cleanup could amount to a regulatory taking of the property
owner's property. As the recent regulatory takings cases instruct, the
Penn Central analysis is used to analyze regulatory takings claims in order
to balance the interests of the property owner against the interests of the
state.'57 A finding of a regulatory taking under the Penn Central analysis
is dependent entirely on the facts that are presented to the court.'
58
1. A Possible "As Applied" Taking
In order to determine if a regulatory taking has occurred when these
statutes are enforced, a court balances: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the [property owner]"; (2) "the extent to which the regula-
tion has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and (3)
"the character of the governmental action."' 59  The cost of metham-
phetamine cleanup, as discussed above, can run into the tens of thou-
sands of dollars. 16° On top of this cost, the economic value of the prop-
erty"' and the economic value of its use (for example, by leasing the
property to tenants' 6' or* by opening the property to paying guests as a
hotel, motel, or bed and breakfast) 63 can add up to a significant cost to
Washington's and Tennessee's statutory language and the relationship between the statu-
tory disclosure and removal from quarantine provisions, and the requirement that the
property owner prove that the property has been decontaminated).
156. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-505 (quarantine removed after property is
cleaned), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.050(1) (same), with ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1000(C) (Supp. 2005) ("[Property owner] shall remediate the residually con-
taminated portion of the real property"), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-103 (2005)
("[Property owner] shall meet the cleanup standards for property established by the
board" or "elect instead to demolish the contaminated property").
157. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39 ("Outside... narrow categories.., regulatory tak-
ings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).") (internal citation omitted); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc., 535 U.S. at 322, 335-36 (citing Penn Central for factual inquiry in regulatory takings
case); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (re-
ferring to Penn Central as the "polestar" that "govern[s]" a regulatory takings case).
158. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
159. Id. at 124.
160. See Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 53.
161. For example, the Needhams purchased their house for $169,000. Id. at 52. By the
end of their methamphetamine ordeal they were nearly bankrupt. Id. at 53.
162. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (find-
ing the "loss of rental income" from cleaning up methamphetamine contaminated property
totaled $7200).
163. See Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 53 (indicating that the United States Drug En-
forcement Administration reported that there were 4673 methamphetamine labs discov-
ered in houses, 576 in apartments and condominiums, and 319 in hotels and motels). The
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the property owner if use of the property is restricted when designated as
a methamphetamine contamination site.'64 A court may also find that the
methamphetamine statute interferes with a property owner's "distinct
investment-backed expectations."" The courts in the CERCLA takings
cases found that the statute did not interfere with investment backed ex-
pectations because the property owners were also the contributors of the
hazardous waste and because the objective of CERCLA is to target the
contributors of the hazardous waste.' 66 The methamphetamine statutes
167are not so limited to target only the producer of the methamphetamine,
and therefore, this reasoning would be inapplicable in the case of an in-
nocent property owner who had no connection with the methampheta-
mine contamination.
In addition, the landscape of the problem of methamphetamine con-
tamination can be painted just as it was by Justice Holmes in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. In Pennsylvania Coal Co., Justice Holmes wrote, "[a]
source of damage to [a single private] house is not a public nuisance even
if similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The damage is
not common or public."' '6 The Court further determined that private,
contractual notice of the danger to the individual property owner was
sufficient to warn the individual property owner of the harms the statute
sought to prevent.69 Although there may be "similar damage" from
methamphetamine contamination "inflicted on others in different
places," one can argue that "[tihe damage is not.., public.' 170 The dam-
age is inflicted on several "single private" residential properties. 7 1 In
cleanup costs can be greater for owners of larger buildings with multi-residential units
because some statutes require cleanup well beyond the initial locus of the methampheta-
mine manufacture. See ARIz. ADMIN. CODE § R4-30-305(B)(4) to (5) (2005) (providing
an extensive list of items that must be cleaned and the manner in which they are to be
cleaned for both "areas highly suggestive of contamination" and "areas not highly sugges-
tive of contamination"); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41D.0102-.0103 (stating that assessment
of property prior to decontamination includes ventilation systems that "serve[] more than
one unit or structure such as motels, apartments, row houses or multiple-family dwellings
to determine whether contamination entered other residences or rooms," which must then
be cleaned according to the decontamination regulations).
164. See supra notes 162-63.
165. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
166. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Asarco Inc., No. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, 1999 WL 33313132, at *7 (D. Idaho
Sept. 30, 1999).
167. See generally supra notes 114-16, 127, 132-41 and accompanying text (stating that a
property owner of a contaminated property is required to clean up his property once it has
been designated as contaminated under the applicable methamphetamine statute).
168. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
169. Id. at 414.
170. See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
171. See id.
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addition, just as the mining contracts in Pennsylvania Coal Co. provided
notice, the reporting provisions of these statutes provide notice to prop-
erty owners entering into private contracts for the sale or purchase of
land.172 Given the similarities with Pennsylvania Coal Co. and the fact-
based inquiry courts employ for regulatory takings inquiries, a court
could find that these statutes, as applied to a property owner, amount to a
regulatory taking.
2. Possibly Not an "As Applied" Taking
On the other hand, there is also a strong argument against finding that
the methamphetamine regulations requiring cleanup would amount to a
regulatory taking. This is because one of the Penn Central factors, "the
character of the governmental action, 173 weighs heavily in favor of the
government in its regulation of methamphetamine contaminated proper-
ties. As discussed above, the methamphetamine "threat" is rapidly ex-
panding across states, and exposure to methamphetamine contaminated
properties presents a serious health risk to those who come in contact
with the contamination. 17 4 Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee, and Washing-
ton enacted their methamphetamine statutes to serve the important pur-
pose of protecting property and persons from the dangers resulting from
methamphetamine manufacture. With maybe the exception of Penn-
sylvania Coal Co., the Supreme Court has refrained from evaluating the
176nature of a safety ordinance when deciding a regulatory takings case.
However, that is not to say that the status of a regulation as a safety ordi-
nance is not significant in the regulatory takings analysis. 77 To the con-
trary, the Court in First English Evangelical remanded the case to the
172. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(F)(1)-(5) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-
18.5-103(2) to (3) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-507 to -508 (Supp. 2005); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.030(1), .050(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
173. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
174. See supra notes 19-21, 28 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.005 (West 2005).
176. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 312-13 (1987); Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413-14. In Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court
focused on the safety regulation and determined that it was not necessary to protect indi-
vidual property owners in private contractual relationships for coal extraction from the
dangers associated with subsidence of land. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413-14. In First
English Evangelical, the Court left the determination of the status of the regulation as a
taking to the California courts and stated, "We ... have no occasion to decide.., whether
the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by estab-
lishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact
safety regulations." First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 313; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328-29 (2002) (discussing
disposition of First English Evangelical, that on remand the California court determined
that the safety ordinance was not a regulatory taking).
177. See, e.g, First English Evangelical, 428 U.S. at 313.
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California courts to determine if the safety ordinance amounted to a
regulatory taking,' and on remand, the California court determined that
a taking did not exist. 9 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in Cagle v. King
County, placed weight on the fact that the methamphetamine statute at
issue was designed to protect the health and safety of the public when the
court determined that the statute did not violate a property owner's pro-
cedural due process rights.' 80 Therefore, an argument can be made that
because the methamphetamine statutes are safety ordinances, it will be
difficult to find a violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments de-
spite the significant costs to the property owner.
B. The Property Owner's Choice: The Guidelines Approach
For states that employ Arkansas's approach to methamphetamine de-
contamination (creating a voluntary scheme where property owners
choose to decontaminate their property and choose to follow the guide-
lines), there is obviously no regulatory takings issue because the guide-• • 181
lines do not have the force of law and are not considered regulations.
For property owners, this may seem like the best approach because there
is no legal requirement to do anything about methamphetamine con-
182tamination. However, where the other statutes are unbalanced in terms
of their cleanup provisions, 3 the Arkansas cleanup guidelines arguably
also create an imbalance in the law in terms of the notice provisions.14
Just as there is no requirement to clean up property, there is no require-
ment for property owners to disclose the methamphetamine contamina-
178. Id.
179. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at
328-29.
180. See Cagle v. King County, 70 F. App'x 450, 452-53 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the
issue in Cagle was a due process challenge to Washington's methamphetamine statute, id.
at 452, and the Supreme Court recently rejected using a due process analysis in a Takings
Clause challenge, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005), the nature of the
governmental action is a factor that is balanced in both types of analysis. Compare Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (balancing "the character of
the governmental action"), with Cagle, 70 F. App'x at 452 (balancing "'the Government's
interest, including the function involved"' (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976))).
181. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-7-132 (2005); ARK. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 25, at 2.
182. See Rineheart, supra note 9 (discussing property owners expressing opinions
against regulation requiring cleanup).
183. See supra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing regulatory takings issues with statutes following
the requirements approach).
184. See Tracy, supra note 69, at 184-85 (acknowledging the importance of notice for
property owners and future property owners when making decisions regarding the transfer
of property).
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tion to future parties interested in the property either, as is required in
Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee, and Washington.'" The Arkansas De-
partment of Health and Human Services references the absence of a uni-
fied or centralized system for keeping track of properties used as
methamphetamine laboratories. When entering into a contract to pur-
chase property, a buyer should have the benefit of full knowledge of the
property's history, and the prospective purchaser should have the oppor-
tunity to accept or decline to purchase property once used as a metham-
phetamine laboratory.'8 While Arkansas refrains from requiring a prop-
erty owner to clean up his property, the state should require property
owners to disclose to future interested parties the fact that the property
was once a methamphetamine laboratory and could be contaminated.'m
From a policy standpoint, the problem of "[i]nnocent members of the
public" being "harmed when they are unknowingly exposed to [chemical
methamphetamine residues]" is "frustrated by the lack of a" standard for
discovering the criminal history of the property. 9
III. CERCLA AND MTCA DEFENSES SHOULD SERVE AS A MODEL FOR
STATES
Even though the outcome of a takings challenge to a methampheta-
mine cleanup statute may be uncertain,' 90 current protection for property
owners recovering cleanup costs under the methamphetamine statutes is
limited or impractical.'9 ' Unfortunately, protection based on insurance
185. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(F) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-
103(2) to (3), -104 to -105(2) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-505, -507 (Supp. 2005);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.050(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
186. ARK. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 25, at 1-2.
187. See Tracy, supra note 69, at 172-73 (addressing the problem that the lack of stan-
dards for reporting contaminated land poses to prospective purchasers and recommending
"that legislatures... impose an affirmative duty on the seller to disclose information about
contaminated land to the buyer").
188. See id. at 172-73, 224.
189. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1301 (2005) (expressing legislative concern over "lack
of a decontamination standard," not a reporting standard, but the problems are inter-
twined); Tracy, supra note 69, at 172-73, 224. It is in the best interest of states and prop-
erty owners to ensure that some sort of notice is required to combat the spread of
methamphetamine by exposing these dangerous "clandestine" laboratories. See supra
notes 23-29 and accompanying text (describing clandestine nature of laboratories and
potentially harmful health effects).
190. See supra Part I.A.
191. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-103(2) (2005) (excluding methamphetamine
manufacturers from the provision that releases property owners from civil liability once
their property has been decontaminated). The particular liability from which the property
owner is released is liability arising from alleged bodily injury due to the presence of haz-
ardous chemical residues from the former methamphetamine laboratory. Id. However,
the language that excludes methamphetamine manufacturers from this same immunity to
"health-based civil actions" does not specifically mention the type of liability, so presuma-
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coverage is limited by individual insurance policies.' 92 However, an effec-
bly a property owner might choose to sue the methamphetamine manufacturer for chemi-
cal cleanup. See generally id. Montana's methamphetamine statute contains a similar
provision, but the language in Montana's statute excludes a manufacturer of metham-
phetamine from immunity for civil liability "in any action ... based on the presence of
methamphetamine in an inhabitable property." MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1305(4) to (5)
(2005).
The Texas legislature went a step further than Colorado in defining the civil liability of
a methamphetamine manufacturer when it enacted its methamphetamine statute, creating
strict liability for the manufacture of methamphetamine. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 99.002-.003 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006). The liability specifically covers
"any exposure by an individual to the manufacturing process, including exposure to the
methamphetamine itself or any of the byproducts or waste products incident to the manu-
facture," id. § 99.003, calculated by either: "(1) actual damages for personal injury, death,
or property damage as a result of the exposure; or (2) $20,000 for each incident of expo-
sure," id., whichever amount is greater. Id. Therefore, in Texas, a property owner can
bring a claim against the methamphetamine manufacturer who caused the contamination
on the owner's property and recover the costs of cleanup. However, the methampheta-
mine manufacturer may be judgment proof, so it is likely impractical to sue the metham-
phetamine manufacturer under any theory of liability because a property owner is not
likely to receive any monetary damages that may be awarded. See generally Clinton W.
Taylor, Comment, The Oklahoma Drug Dealer Liability Act: A Civil Remedy for a "Vic-
timless" Crime, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 228, 233 (1999) (describing a trend in legislatures to
allow a victim who has been injured by a drug related crime to bring civil tort proceedings
against the criminal defendant and the difficulty victims have finding a criminal defendant
with deep pockets (or a statutory prohibition to sue anyone other than a judgment proof
"retail level" dealer)).
192. See, e.g., Graff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 P.3d 1266, 1268 (discussing method of insur-
ance policy interpretation) (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). Prior to the time that methampheta-
mine laboratory contamination really became an issue in the United States, courts inter-
preted insurance policies in a manner that allowed the policy holder to recover costs of
damage to the property resulting from a third party's illegal use of the property. See, e.g.,
Livaditis v. Am. Cas. Co., 160 S.E.2d 449,450-51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (finding manufacture
of moonshine an illegal use of property). In Livaditis v. American Casualty Co., the Court
of Appeals of Georgia found that damage resulting from a third party's manufacture of
moonshine, which created smoke and mold stains on walls and carpets, did not preclude a
property owner from recovering under the "vandalism" provision of his insurance policy.
Id. at 450-53 (holding, however, that the property owner was ultimately barred from re-
covery under the policy because the property owner did not meet the twelve month re-
quirement for filing a claim for the loss). For a recent case interpreting Livaditis and deal-
ing with illegal activity other than methamphetamine manufacture, see Bowers v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 991 P.2d 734, 735,737-38 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that mold damage
from third party's manufacture of marijuana was covered under the "vandalism" provision
even though policy explicitly excluded recovery for mold damage).
In recent cases dealing with claims by policy holders for recovery from damage resulting
from methamphetamine manufacture, courts have likewise attempted to fit the type of
damage within provisions of the policy to allow property owners to recover from their
insurance company. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332, 1334-36, 1338-39
(Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding methamphetamine contamination by a third party operating
a methamphetamine lab did not bar the policy holder from recovery under the insurance
policy because methamphetamine "odor" and smoke damaged the house; policy holder
recovered $38,000 for the cost of cleaning up the damage from the manufacture of
methamphetamine because even though the policy excluded recovery for "contamination,"
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tive and alternative means of protection can be found in the current fed-
eral and state statutes that regulate decontamination of hazardous waste
in general-CERCLA and its state counterparts."' CERCLA (and
Washington's MTCA, for example)194 provides a complete defense to
liability for cleaning up hazardous waste when a property owner was un-
aware of the contamination prior to ownership of the property and did
not contribute to the contamination.195 The following proposed language
damage from the methamphetamine vapors was separate from the contamination dam-
age); Graff, 54 P.3d at 1268-70 (resulting contamination from a third party's operation of a
methamphetamine laboratory was covered under the "vandalism" provision of the insur-
ance policy over the insurance company's claims that recovery should be barred because
the damage to the property was not visible and the policy excluded coverage of contamina-
tion). Therefore, it is possible to recover costs of decontaminating a former metham-
phetamine laboratory from an insurance policy, but recovery depends on the nature of the
damage and the particular provisions of the insurance policy. See Graff, 54 P.3d at 1268
(interpreting the coverage of an insurance policy so that "effect [is given] to each of [the
policy's] provisions" and "the court characterizes the peril causing the loss"). The prop-
erty owner is therefore limited to the provisions of his insurance policy and the court's
characterization of the methamphetamine damage, see id. at 1268-69, although these cases
suggest that a property owner in Washington or Oregon may be able to recover if he can
convince the court that the damage was caused by "vandalism" or "vapors." See Farmers
Ins. Co., 858 P.2d at 1336 (vapors); Graff, 54 P.3d at 1268-70 (vandalism).
193. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (third party defense
to liability for hazardous waste contamination); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.040(3)
(West 2002) (third party defense to liability for hazardous waste contamination).
194. Another source of an innocent owner defense can be found in state criminal and
civil forfeiture laws. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4106(a)(3) (2004) ("No property is subject
to forfeiture under this act if the owner or interest holder acquired the property before or
during the conduct giving rise to the property's forfeiture, and such owner or interest
holder: (A) Did not know and could not have reasonably known of the act or omission or
that it was likely to occur; or (B) acted reasonably to prevent the conduct giving rise to
forfeiture."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.43(C) (LexisNexis 2006) ("No property shall
be forfeited pursuant to this division if the owner of the property establishes, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the owner neither knew, nor should have known after a rea-
sonable inquiry, that the property was used, or was likely to be used, in a crime or adminis-
trative violation."); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.02(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005)
(stating that an owner must prove by preponderance of the evidence that he acquired
interest in the property before or during the "act or omission giving rise to forfeiture," or
in the case of real property, also "did not know or should not reasonably have known of
the act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
69.50.505(1)(h) (West Supp. 2006) (stating that property tied to distribution or manufac-
ture of controlled substances is subject to forfeiture unless the owner of the property did
not consent to the controlled substance violation or the offense was committed without the
property owner's knowledge).
195. For the defense in CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3). Section
9607(b)(3) provides in relevant part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by ... (3) an act or omission of a third party ....
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is modeled on this defense with minor changes to allow more certain pro-
tection for an "innocent property owner" who may unknowingly pur-
chase contaminated property' 96 or who owns property and is unaware of
its current use as a methamphetamine laboratory by a third party.197
A. Proposed Language
In an enforcement proceeding under this chapter, the current owner of
the property deemed contaminated shall have a complete defense to li-
ability for the cost of decontamination if the property owner can prove by
a preponderance of the evidence98 that:
(1) the property was used as a laboratory for the manufacture of
methamphetamine; and
(a) the owner lacked knowledge' 99 of the methamphetamine con-
tamination; or
(b) the contamination from the manufacture of methamphetamine
was caused entirely by a third party0° and use of the property as a
methamphetamine laboratory was reasonably unforeseeable to the
201owner.
Id. Section 9601(35) defines the level of knowledge necessary for § 9607(b)(3) to apply.
Id. § 9601(35). For the defense in Washington's CERCLA counterpart, see WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 70.105D.040(3) ("The following persons are not liable under this section:
(a) Any person who can establish that the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance for which the person would be otherwise responsible was caused solely by:...
(iii) An act or omission of a third party (including but not limited to a trespasser) ... [or]
(b) Any person who is an owner, past owner, or purchaser of a facility and who can estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the facility was acquired by the
person, the person had no knowledge or reason to know that any hazardous substance...
resulted in or contributed to the need for the remedial action, was released or disposed of
on, in, or at the facility.").
196. See, e.g., Jerome et al., supra note 1, at 52 (describing the Needhams' situation in
which they learned after they purchased their home that it was used as a methampheta-
mine laboratory).
197. See, e.g., Graff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 P.3d 1266, 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (not-
ing that the owner discovered that the tenant as well as others who may have been hiding
on the property manufactured methamphetamine on the property).
198. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3) (requiring preponderance of the evidence
standard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.040(3)(b) (same).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (defining level of knowledge required for defense);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.040(3)(b)(i)-(iii) (same).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (third party defense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.105D.040(3)(a)(iii) (same).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(i) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.105D.040(3)(b)(i). The proposed language here for unforeseeability is a gloss on the
knowledge required in CERCLA or Washington's MTCA for the third party defense, that
paraphrases the catch-all language that "reason to know" includes "all appropriate in-
quiry," "consistent with good commercial or customary practice," and "commonly known
or reasonably ascertainable information about the property." Id.
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(2) Knowledge of the methamphetamine contamination is presumed
if the owner receives notice from a law enforcement agency,202 state
health department, 20 3 or if the status of contamination is filed on record
with the deed in the courthouse of the county in which the property is
located, 4 or in accordance with the notice provisions otherwise provided
in this chapter.
If a property owner qualifies for the complete defense to liability, the
property will be decontaminated according to the procedures set up in
this chapter and any costs incurred for the decontamination will be cov-
ered by a fund established under this chapter. 26
202. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1000(A)(1)-(2) (2003) ("At the time of the
discovery [of the methamphetamine laboratory] or arrest, [the law enforcement officer]
shall deliver a copy of the notice of removal ... to the owner of the real property if the
owner is on the site at the time of delivery [and] ... shall send the notice of removal by
certified mail to the owner of the real property.").
203. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006
legislation) ("The local health officer shall cause the order to be served either personally
or by certified mail, with return receipt requested, upon all occupants and persons having
any interest therein .... "); see also supra note 27 (providing example of Washington State
Department of Health's list of contaminated properties, which can be accessed by property
owners on the Internet).
204. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-507(a) (Supp. 2005) ("[T]he local law enforce-
ment agency quarantining the property shall file, for recording, a notice of methampheta-
mine lab quarantine in the office of county register in the county in which the real property
or any portion of the real property lies."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.050(1) ("A
release for reuse document shall be recorded in the real property records indicating the
property has been decontaminated .... ").
205. For an example of such an account, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.44.060(7)
(establishing a decontamination account for enforcement of Washington's methampheta-
mine statute through funds received from fees collected under the chapter). Other sources
might include money collected from state taxes or from restitution received from the
methamphetamine manufacturer upon conviction for the manufacture of methampheta-
mine. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(B) (2003); id. § 68-212-506 (allowing
for restitution adjudged during enforcement of criminal drug laws to include costs incurred
by the government to clean up property damage resulting from drug violation). For an
argument weighing use of restitution to compensate victims of drug crimes, see Taylor,
supra note 191, at 229-31 (claiming that restitution is within a judge's discretion and can be
imposed at sentencing, but sometimes the injury to the victim has not been realized at the
time of sentencing). In addition, states may receive federal funding for cleanup of
methamphetamine waste if currently proposed federal legislation is enacted. See Federal
Emergency Meth Lab Cleanup Funding Act of 2005, S. 259, 109th Cong. (2005) (providing,
under section 2, funding for up to 90% of a property owner's cleanup costs if the property
owner can prove that he did not have knowledge of the laboratory's existence before dis-
covery by law enforcement, or if the property owner notifies law enforcement within
twenty-four hours of discovery of the laboratory's existence); Clean, Learn, Educate,
Abolish, Neutralize, and Undermine Production (CLEAN-UP) of Methamphetamines
Act, H.R. 13, 109th Cong. (2005) (providing, under section 102, $15,000,000 in grants to
state and local government and private companies that respond to methamphetamine
contamination on agricultural land, and under section 104, $20,000,000 in grants to law
enforcement for the identification and cleanup of methamphetamine laboratories).
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B. Analysis of Proposed Language
One of the reasons that CERCLA has withstood a takings challenge is
because it contains a defense for innocent property owners2° that allows
property owners "who acquire a property after the disposal of hazardous
wastes without any knowledge of its environmental contamination" to
escape liability for cleaning up the contamination when the contamina-
tion was caused by the unforeseeable conduct of a third party. Provid-
ing property owners with a defense to liability for the cleanup costs not
only decreases the chances of a property owner succeeding in a takings
208challenge of the methamphetamine decontamination statutes, but it
also protects the "[i]nnocent members of the public 2" 9 in a larger sense
by protecting the innocent property owners of the contaminated property
in question.21 A defense that hinges on the knowledge of the property
owner may protect unknowing property owners from the health effects of
exposure to the contaminated property and from liability for cleanup
costs, whereas the current methamphetamine statutes only protect un-
211knowing property owners from the health effects of exposure. Under
the proposed language, the property owner who can prove that he lacked
knowledge will be protected from liability, but the property will still be
decontaminated, with the costs provided from the chapter's funding pro-.• 212
vision. The knowledge definition in the proposed language is inten-
tionally broad in order for the defense to be incorporated into a statute
with or without a specific notice requirement to allow states more flexi-
bility to collect, distribute, or require information concerning a property's
use as a methamphetamine laboratory. 3 Under this broad definition, the
previous owner of the property who had the requisite knowledge of the
property's history as a drug laboratory might also be open to liability for
cleanup costs, which could allow the state to seek action against the pre-
vious owner, as is possible under CERCLA or its state counterparts. 4
206. Cf. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Asarco Inc., No. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, 1999 WL 33313132, at *1 (D. Idaho
Sept. 30, 1999).
207. Nowak, supra note 68, at 838-39 (discussing "interplay" between 42 U.S.C. §§
9601(35), 9607(b)(3)).
208. See Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 734; Asarco Inc., 1999 WL 33313132, at
*1.
209. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.44.005 (West 2005).
210. See supra Part II.
211. See supra Part II.
212. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing possibilities for funding
options in the proposed language).
213. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (describing various notice re-
quirements of selected states).
214. The notice requirements in some of the current methamphetamine statutes illus-
trate that encouragement of notice requirements may also allow an "innocent property
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Placing the protection in the methamphetamine statute itself may pro-
vide more certainty as to who will end up paying the cost for metham-
phetamine decontamination because it does not rely on the fact-based
215balancing test employed in a regulatory takings analysis. Instead, the
statute provides specific elements that a property owner must prove, and
if the property owner succeeds in proving these elements, the property
216
owner unquestionably falls within the scope of the protection. In addi-
tion, the statute provides protection for states by encouraging statutory
notice requirements that would be sufficient to defeat a property owner's
claims that he lacked the requisite knowledge regarding the metham-
owner" to recover costs from a knowledgeable prior owner. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-1000(G) (2003) ("If an owner fails to provide any notice required by this section, the
owner is subject to a civil penalty of one thousand dollars and is liable for any harm result-
ing from the owner's failure to comply with the requirements of this section."); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1102.18(b)(4) (Deering 2004) (repealed 2006) ("Failure of the owner to provide
written notice to the buyer when required by this subdivision shall subject the owner to
actual damages and any other remedies provided by law. In addition, if the owner has
actual knowledge of the presence of any release of an illegal controlled substance and
knowingly and willfully fails to provide written notice to the buyer,... the owner is liable
for a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars . . . for each separate violation, in
addition to any other damages provided by law."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-18.5-103(2)
(2005) (releasing owner from liability once "the clean-up standards and documentation
requirements" are met); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-1305(2) to (4) (2005) (releasing owner
or agent from liability once methamphetamine contamination is reported to the subse-
quent owner or occupant and the property has been decontaminated).
215. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 801-03 (1995) (describing the uncer-
tainty of the Court's takings jurisprudence after Pennsylvania Coal Co. and the difficulty
that courts have in determining whether or not a taking exists); see also Wade, COURSE OF
STUDY, supra note 38, at 358 (criticizing uncertainty of takings jurisprudence and calling
for clarity in application).
216. It has been argued that the CERCLA defenses do not provide as much certainty
for property owners in practice because they have been inconsistently interpreted by
courts. See generally Nowak, supra note 68, at 841-45 (reviewing available case law inter-
preting the CERCLA "innocent landowner defense" and concluding, "[t]he innocent
landowner defense has generated widely discrepant views as to what efforts are sufficient
to fulfill the obligation of inquiry into the property"). However, because actions under
CERCLA typically deal with commercial property owners, courts hold these owners to a
higher standard of knowledge than residential property owners, see id. at 843-44, which
would likely not be the case for the majority of owners who fall under the methampheta-
mine cleanup liability statutes. These owners are residential owners, who would not be
held to as high a standard as a commercial owner subject to liability under CERCLA. See
id. at 843-44; see also supra notes 5, 23 and accompanying text (describing residential prop-
erty as the increasingly popular locus for clandestine methamphetamine laboratories).
Furthermore, factual inquiry into the property owner's level of knowledge is much less
problematic than inquiry into whether a regulation has gone "'too far'' under the "'gen-
eral rule"' in Pennsylvania Coal Co. See Treanor, supra note 215, at 801-03 (quoting Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922)) (describing the problems associated with
interpretation of the "general rule" in Pennsylvania Coal Co.).
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phetamine contamination. 7 As time passes, these notice requirements
will serve to alleviate the burden on states to pay the costs of metham-
phetamine cleanup, because theoretically, fewer property owners will be
able to claim that they are "innocent," and therefore, should be released
from cleanup liability. However, this also depends upon a decrease in
the number of properties used as "clandestine methamphetamine labora-
tories, '219 which is where the focus would next turn to federal and state
law enforcement of criminal drug laws to stop the spread of metham-
220phetamine.
IV. CONCLUSION
The methamphetamine problem in the United States is burdening the
resources of state governments and law enforcement2 1 It is also burden-
ing state legislatures as they attempt to craft legislation that will protect
landowners and the public from exposure to methamphetamine by ensur-
ing that the laboratories are properly cleaned and the status of the prop-
erty as a former methamphetamine laboratory appropriately recorded.2z
However, these laws are also burdening property owners by either plac-
ing the burden of methamphetamine costs on the owners of property who
unknowingly purchase property or by giving the property owners an op-
tion to decontaminate without requiring property owners with knowledge
of the contamination to disclose the contamination to future interested
parties. When states require property owners to pay the cleanup costs, it
is possible that the state will have to compensate the property owner after
217. If courts interpret the knowledge requirement narrowly and read the statute
against protecting a particular property owner claiming the defense, then the state is af-
forded more protection in quickly being able to resolve the issue of who is going to pay for
the methamphetamine contamination.
218. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
220. See generally Cazenavette Statement, supra note 19. This focus is outside the
scope of this Comment, but illustrates the intersection of the criminal and property laws
concerning the spread of methamphetamine in the United States.
221. This burden is from the standpoint of combating the spread of methamphetamine
and preventing harm to the public from exposure to the chemical residue associated with
its manufacture. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-10-2(a)-(f) (LexisNexis 2005) (bur-
den on state); see also Cazenavette Statement, supra note 19, at 14 (burden on law en-
forcement).
222. See IOWA BUREAU OF TOXICOLOGY, supra note 106, at 3 ("IDPH is working to
find an answer [to the cleanup problem] that will protect the public and be practical for
property owners."); Hannan, supra note 20, at 24 (noting that a lack of standard leaves
states to their own devices); James D. Polley, IV, Capital Perspective, PROSECUTOR, May-
June 2005, at 43, 44 ("State legislatures are wrestling with controlling meth."); Rineheart,
supra note 9 (displaying conflicting opinions between regulators and property owners over
methamphetamine contamination cleanup and the choices that regulators must make in
drafting legislation).
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a successful regulatory takings challenge in court. States can avoid suc-
cessful regulatory takings challenges by including a defense in their
methamphetamine contamination statutes that protects unknowing prop-
erty owners, yet, at the same time, broadly defines knowledge to ensure
that former methamphetamine laboratories are no longer clandestine.
